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A B S T R A C T
Lebanon has had an ambiguous approach to the more than one million Syrians seeking
protection in the country since 2011. The country is neither party to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, nor does it have any national legislation
dealing with refugees. In October 2014, Lebanon’s Council of Ministers adopted the
first comprehensive policy on Syrian displacement, one explicit goal of which is to de-
crease the number of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory and encourag-
ing return to Syria. This ambition is currently being implemented through the
December 2014 General Security Office new set of entry requirements for Syrians and
new rules for Syrian nationals already in Lebanon applying for and renewing their resi-
dency permits. Building on 10 months of fieldwork in Lebanon, this article explores
the legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in light of the recent regulatory changes.
It argues that these leave many refugees in a deeply precarious legal position, with an
overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees present in Lebanon without legal status. In
essence, this article argues that Syrians in Lebanon are left with two options: they ei-
ther leave the country or stay and accept exploitation.
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1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
The commencement of the Syrian conflict in 2011 brought about substantial refugee
flows into Syria’s neighbouring countries, i.e. Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq.
One of the heaviest burdens is borne by Lebanon, currently hosting more than one
million registered refugees, in addition to between 300,000 and 500,000 unregistered
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Article
refugees throughout Lebanon.1 Added to these numbers are also an approximate
45,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria.2
Lebanon, a country with an already fragile governance system and sub-standard
infrastructure,3 has had an ambiguous approach to Syrians seeking protection in the
country. The country is currently experiencing deep political deadlock, having been
without a President since May 2014 and due to the two-time postponement of par-
liamentary elections scheduled for 2013. Thirty years of Syrian military presence has
moreover influenced Government policies towards refugees from Syria, as has the
country’s long-term Palestinian refugee presence.
The country is neither party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees,4 nor does it have any national legislation dealing with refugees. Syrian refu-
gees have thus no status other than that afforded to Syrian nationals in general. They
are furthermore not referred to by Government authorities as “refugees” but as
“displaced” persons, a less historically- and legally loaded term.
Only in October 2014 did Lebanon’s Council of Ministers adopt a comprehensive
policy on Syrian displacement, one explicit goal of which is to decrease the number
of Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory and encouraging return to
Syria. This ambition is currently being implemented through the issuance of the
General Security Office’s (GSO) new set of entry requirements for Syrians and new
rules for Syrian nationals already in Lebanon applying for and renewing residency
permits in December 2014.5 For the first time since its establishment, the Lebanese
State now imposes restrictive measures on the entry of Syrian nationals into the
country.6
This article seeks to explore the legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon in light
of these recent regulatory changes. It is based on 10 months of field research in
Lebanon in 2015 and 2016, including approximately 50 semi-structured interviews
with Syrian refugees across the country as well as with Government authorities, law-
yers, judges, and United Nations (UN)/non-governmental organisation (NGO)
workers in Beirut. The article begins with a general overview of the Lebanese
Government’s refugee response since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011,
and continues with an elaboration of Lebanon’s relationship with the international
refugee law regime and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
1 UNHCR, Syria Regional Refugee Response: Lebanon, Inter-agency Information Sharing Portal, undated,
available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id¼122 (last visited 1 Oct. 2016);
Norwegian Refugee Council & International Rescue Committee, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria:
Challenges and Consequences of Maintaining Legal Stay in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, Norwegian Refugee
Council/Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), Jun. 2015, available at: http://www.ref
world.org/docid/56cabc8c4.html (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
2 Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Minutes of Inter-sectoral Meeting: Beirut, 12 June 2015, 2015, available
at: https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id¼9033 (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
3 N. Yassin, T. Osseiran, R. Rassi & M. Boustani, No Place to Stay? Reflections on the Syrian Refugee Shelter
Policy in Lebanon, Beirut, Issam Fares Institute (AUB) & UN-Habitat, 2015.
4 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, 28 Jul. 1951 (entry into force: 22 Apr.
1954).
5 Most of these documents have not been published on the GSO website. Some on file with author.
6 G. Frangieh, “Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians”, Legal Agenda, 2015, available
at: http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id¼679&folder¼articles&lang¼en (last visited 1 Oct.
2016).
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(UNHCR). It thereafter describes the national legislation applicable to Syrians prior
to 2015, before exploring the regulatory changes that emerged in 2015. Following
this, the article highlights the particularly perilous situation of Palestinian refugees
from Syria and explains how the 2015 changes leave many refugees in a deeply pre-
carious legal position.
2 . O V E R V I E W O F S Y R I A N R E F U G E E R E S P O N S E I N L E B A N O N
In the early stages of Syrian displacement, Lebanon won significant praise from
human rights groups and UNHCR for its open borders and non-encampment pol-
icy.7 Closer scrutiny nevertheless suggests that these policies were not the result of
any particular, intentional Government approach to Syrian refugees, but are rather
symptomatic of the current political stalemate. This impasse within constitutional in-
stitutions has paralysed public policy on Syrian displacement, and in fact led to the
Government having no strategy at all to respond to the influx of refugees in the early
stages of Syrian displacement. This, in turn, initiated varying and sometimes contra-
dictory responses within Government agencies and municipalities alike.8
The refugee issue is highly politicised in Lebanon, and the Government’s stance
towards Syrian refugees can be explained on the one hand by Lebanon’s previous
refugee experience with Palestinians, and, on the other, by the major antagonistic
political parties’ conflicting attitudes towards the conflict in Syria.9 The diverging ap-
proach to refugees was particularly evident in the recurrent debate on the establish-
ment of refugee camps, which has been favoured by one political front and
strenuously opposed by another.10
The ambiguity of the Government response was exacerbated with the coming
into power of the then caretaker Prime Minister Naguib Miqati, who in mid-2012 es-
tablished a policy of neutrality towards the events in Syria under the label of the “dis-
association policy”.11 The policy aimed to preserve the delicate political balance
between the various sectarian forces which, as political factions, were unable to come
to agreement. However, as Meier argues, “Pretending to be neutral, this policy in
fact adopted the point of view of the most powerful – the Syrian government – and
was referring to traditional links between main political components of the Lebanese
government with the Asad regime.”12
7 L. Turner, “Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour
Market in Lebanon and Jordan”, Mediterranean Politics, 20(3), 2015, 1–19; B. Frelick, Fleeing Syria:
Insights on Lebanon’s Open Border, New York, Human Rights Watch, 2013; J. Dettmer, “It’s About Time:
United Nations Plans Refugee Camps for Syrians in Lebanon”, Daily Beast, 12 Jun. 2013, available at
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/12/it-s-about-time-united-nations-plans-refugee-camps-
for-syrians-in-lebanon.html (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
8 Yassin et al., No Place to Stay?.
9 O. Dahi, “The Refugee Crisis in Lebanon and Jordan: The Need for Economic Development Spending”,
Forced Migration Review, 47, Sep. 2014, 11–13; D. Meier, “Lebanon: The Refugee Issue and the Threat of
a Sectarian Confrontation”, Oriente moderno, 94(2), 2014, 382–401.
10 Yassin et al., No Place to Stay?.
11 Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN, Baabda Declaration Issued by the National Dialogue Committee
on 11 June 2012, New York, UN Security Council, 2012.
12 Meier, “Lebanon”.
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One strand of this disassociation policy was the enforcement by Miqati of the use
of “displaced persons” (“nazihoun” in Arabic) as a legitimate terminology rather than
“refugees” (“lajioun”). The Government rejects, in principle, the integration of refu-
gees and does not consider itself a country of asylum, but rather one of transit.13
One explanation for this lies in the strong association of “refugee” with Palestinian;
“displaced” then appears suggestive of a less permanent status.14 But the usage of
this term may also be seen as an attempt to circumvent any obligations and privileges
owed to these individuals by virtue of their refugeehood.15 As one Government offi-
cial explained to me, “From the Government’s perspective, the refugee is more diffi-
cult because he has rights. Displaced have less rights.”16 Statements such as these
suggest, despite Lebanon not being a party to the main refugee protection instru-
ments, an uneasy and complicated relationship between Lebanon and the interna-
tional refugee regime. However, as this article intends to show, the Lebanese
Government considers the growing number of Syrian refugees in the country to be a
serious threat to the security, political, economic, and social stability and has enacted
laws and policies that treat Syrian refugees as undesirable foreigners.
Due to the political stalemate and lack of national policy for the management of
the Syrian refugee influx at central Government level, Lebanese municipalities, who
have long borne the de facto authoritative capability of responding to emerging prob-
lems, were left with managing the increasing flow.17 One of the clearest examples of
this municipality autonomy is the curfews imposed on Syrian refugees, restricting
freedom of movement.18 From August 2014, at least 45 municipalities across
Lebanon have put in place such curfews, which are enforced by municipality police
but also allegedly by local vigilante groups.19
In March 2013, Prime Minister Miqati resigned, and in February 2014, a new
Government was formed. Not long after, this new Government closed 18 unofficial
13 TRANSTEC, Beyond Humanitarian Assistance? UNHCR and the Response to Syrian Refugees in Jordan and
Lebanon January 2013 – April 2014, Brussels, TRANSTEC, 2015.
14 D. Stevens, “Shifting Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection: European and Middle Eastern
Approaches”, in S. Kneebone, D. Stevens & L. Baldassar (eds.), Refugee Protection and the Role of Law:
Conflicting Identities, New York, Routledge, 2014, 73–97.
15 Y. Al-Saadi, Restrictions, Perceptions, and Possibilities of Syrian Refugees’ Self-Agency in Lebanon, Beirut, Civil
Society Knowledge Center, Lebanon Support, Feb. 2015, available at: http://cskc.daleel-madani.org/con
tent/restrictions-perceptions-and-possibilities-syrian-refugees-self-agency-lebanon (last visited 1 Oct.
2016).
16 Confidential interview, Government official, Beirut, 18 Apr. 2016.
17 M. El Helou, “Refugees under Curfew: The War of Lebanese Municipalities against the Poor”, Legal
Agenda, 22 Dec. 2014, available at http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id¼674&folder¼art
icles&lang¼en (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
18 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon, London,
Amnesty International, 2015, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde24/1785/2015/
en/ (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
19 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees, New York, Human
Rights Watch, 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-least-45-local-curfews-
imposed-syrian-refugees (last visited 1 Oct. 2016); Lebanese Center for Human Rights, Conclusions and
Recommendations on the National Conference for the Rights of the Refugees from Syria, Including the Most
Vulnerable Groups, Beirut, Lebanese Center for Human Rights, 2014, available at: http://www.rightsob
server.org/files/Conclusions_and_recommendations_of_the_conference_EN.pdf (last visited 1 Oct.
2016).
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border crossing points that had previously been tolerated,20 and in October that
same year, it took two important steps. The first was the decision to cooperate with
the UN in the development of a Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, which has three
main strategic priorities: (i) ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance primar-
ily to Syrian de facto refugees and the poorest Lebanese; (ii) strengthening the cap-
acity of national and local public delivery systems to accommodate the basic needs of
the aforementioned peoples; and (iii) supporting Lebanon’s economic, social, institu-
tional and environmental stability.”21
The second key step was when the Council of Ministers approved a “Policy Paper
on Syrian Refugee Displacement.” This document sets out three express goals re-
garding “displaced” Syrians in Lebanon: (i) reducing the numbers of Syrian refugees
in the country by reducing access to territory and encouraging Syrian nationals to re-
turn to Syria; (ii) ensuring security by inter alia increasing regulation of the Syrian
population in Lebanon, providing additional support for municipality police and
requiring municipalities to undertake regular statistical surveys; and (iii) easing the
burdens on the infrastructure.22 A number of more specific steps were provided in
the Policy Paper, including strictly enforcing laws governing displaced persons and
foreigners to protect Lebanese employment and employment generally.
3 . L E B A N O N A N D T H E I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E F U G E E L A W R E G I M E
The protracted Palestinian issue is often cited as a reason for a continued refusal of
many States in the Middle East to sign the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.23 Many countries in the region are anxious to ensure
that Palestinian refugees retain their special status and not be subjected to the pre-
vailing norm of resettlement. Lebanon is no exception in this regard, and the country
is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention. By way of customary international
law, however, Lebanon is inter alia bound by leading principles of refugee protection,
not the least the principle of non-refoulement. This principle is generally considered
to be the cornerstone of international refugee law in that it prohibits refugees from
being returned or expelled to places where their lives or freedoms could be
threatened.
Additionally, Lebanon has ratified the major international human rights instru-
ments,24 and the principles of international human rights law are also embedded in
the Lebanese Constitution. The Preamble of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926 (as
amended in 1990) explicitly states that “Lebanon is [. . .] a founding and active
20 M.A. Nayel, “On the Struggle of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon”, Jadaliyya, 17 Apr. 2014, available at:
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17306/on-the-struggle-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon (last visited
1 Oct. 2016).
21 Yassin et al., No Place to Stay?
22 Norwegian Refugee Council & International Rescue Committee, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria.
23 Stevens, “Shifting Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection”.
24 For example, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, 10 Dec. 1984 (entry into force: 26 Jun. 1987); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966 (entry into force: 23 Mar. 1976); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 16 Dec. 1966 (entry into force: 3 Jan.
1976). For a list of ratifications see: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.
aspx?CountryID¼96&Lang¼EN (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
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member of the United Nations Organization and abides by its covenants and by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. It moreover asserts that “the Government
shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception”. Of particular
interest here, this would include Article 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the right to seek asylum. While international human rights conventions constitu-
tionally also take precedence over national law, it has been observed that this prin-
ciple is seldom practiced in domestic courts.25
UNHCR and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) are the two main agencies dealing with refugees from
Syria and Palestinian refugees, respectively. Lebanon has long been reliant on
UNHCR to conduct registration, documentation and refugee status determination
(RSD), and to provide assistance and seek durable solutions for all non-Palestinian
refugees. UNHCR has signed a 2003 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with
Lebanon permitting it to register asylum seekers and conduct refugee status deter-
mination in specific cases.26 Although subject to considerable disagreements about
its interpretation,27 this MoU affirms that “Lebanon does not consider itself an asy-
lum country”, and specifies that an “asylum seeker” means a “person seeking asylum
in a country other than Lebanon”.
The MoU furthermore accepts UNHCR’s protection role against the expectation
that refugees recognised by UNHCR be resettled within a six-month period (which
can be extended once by three months). It thus allows registered refugees to obtain
a temporary “circulation permit” for up to 12 months, when UNHCR is supposed to
resettle the individual. While a 2006 Ministry of Justice advisory note generally af-
firmed that the Government should not forcibly return refugees recognised by
UNHCR, it has occurred that Lebanese authorities have refused to give any signifi-
cance to UNHCR’s refugee status determination decisions, detaining and deporting
hundreds of refugees and asylum-seekers.28
The 2003 MoU has moreover been fiercely condemned on several points by
Lebanese human rights organisations,29 as well as criticised internally within the
Organisation. One UN staff refers to the MoU as a “mistake”30 in that UNHCR obli-
gates itself to resettle a specific category of refugees within a certain time frame,
which, considering UNHCR’s dependency on resettlement States, is a promise
UNHCR hardly should or could make. Another goes further in this criticism to claim
that the MoU itself “is so objectionable to the consciousness of UNHCR today”,31
25 Alef, Two Years On: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Beirut, Alef – Act for Human Rights, 2013, available at:
https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2014/02/alef-presentation-26nov20132.pdf (last visited
1 Oct. 2016).
26 UNHCR, The Memorandum of Understanding between the Directorate of the General Security (Republic of
Lebanon) and the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Concerning the Processing of
Cases of Asylum-seekers Applying for Refugee Status with the UNHCR Office, Geneva, UNHCR, 9 Sep. 2003.
27 Confidential interview, UN official, Beirut, 13 Apr. 2016.
28 M. Kagan, “The UN ‘Surrogate State’ and the Foundation of Refugee Policy in the Middle East”,
University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy, 18, 2012, 307–342.
29 Frontiers Association, Lebanon-UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding, Beirut, Frontiers Association,
2003.
30 Confidential interview, UN official, Beirut, 17 May 2016.
31 Confidential interview, UN official, Beirut, 13 Apr. 2016.
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suggesting that the agreement fails to fulfill the standard normally required by
UNHCR when negotiating such agreements. While negotiations for a new MoU that
would more directly address concerns facing refugees in Lebanon today started at
about the same time as the influx of Syrians to Lebanon in 2011,32 this document re-
mains pending at the Council of Ministers and appears unlikely to materialise in the
near future. As one UN staff commented, “There was a brief window to make it hap-
pen; you have a window of about 12 months to get this thing done.”33 UNHCR has
since toned down both its requests that Lebanon signs the 1951 Refugee
Convention, and its attempts to negotiate a MoU with the Government, concentrat-
ing more on issues of legal stay.
The lack of an updated MoU pertaining to the Syrian refugee influx is currently
problematic as the Lebanese Government does not generally give legal effect to the
UNHCR’s recognition of refugee status and treats most Syrian refugees as illegal im-
migrants liable to arrest.34 Unlike the arrangement for Iraqis, who generally fall under
the 2003 MoU, the Lebanese Government has never agreed for UNHCR to grant
asylum status for Syrians.35 There is thus no prima facie refugee status for Syrians in
Lebanon.
UNHCR is furthermore not permitted to freely register Syrian refugees without
interference from the Lebanese Government. In April 2015, the Ministry of Social
Affairs requested that UNHCR de-register over 1,400 Syrian refugees who had
arrived in Lebanon after 5 January 2015.36 With the exception of humanitarian cases
approved by the Ministry, in May 2015, Lebanese authorities even instructed
UNHCR to temporarily suspend registration of Syrian refugees, including individuals
already in the country and new arrivals. The reason given for this new ban was that a
new mechanism for registration of refugees was to be established,37 but as of mid-
2016 this new instrument has yet to materialise. While there have been negotiations
about a joint UNHCR-Government registration apparatus, amid the Government
aim of reducing the number of refugees in the country, some remain sceptical of the
political will to actually re-start registration.38 In the meantime, UNHCR has re-
sorted to “recording” rather than “registering” individual refugees for the purpose of
both assistance and protection, including resettlement abroad.
32 UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2013 Update: Lebanon, Geneva, UNHCR, 2013, available at: http://
www.unhcr.org/publications/fundraising/50a9f82824/unhcr-global-appeal-2013-update-lebanon.html
(last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
33 Confidential interview, UN official, Beirut, 13 Apr. 2016.
34 J. Chabaan, K. Seyfert, N. I. Salti & G. S. Makkaoui, “Poverty and Livelihoods among UNHCR
Registered Refugees in Lebanon”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32(1), 2013, 24–49.
35 Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum, Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,
Beirut, Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum, 15 Jul. 2014, available at: http://lhif.org/uploaded/News/
d92fe3a1b1dd46f2a281254fa551bd09LHIF%20Background%20Paper%20on%20Unregistered%20Syrian
20Refugees%20(FINAL).pdf (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
36 Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Protection Monthly Dashboard April 2015, Beirut, Inter-agency
Coordination Lebanon, Apr. 2015, available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?
id¼8889 (last visited 1 Oct. 2016); Daily Star, “UNHCR to Cross Off 5,500 Syrian Refugees: Derbas”,
Daily Star, 29 Apr. 2015, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2015/Apr-29/
296164-unhcr-to-cross-off-5500-syrian-refugees-derbas.ashx (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
37 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
38 Confidential interview, NGO staff, Beirut, 5 Mar. 2016.
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4 . N A T I O N A L L E G I S L A T I O N A N D L E G A L S T A T U S O F S Y R I A N S P R I O R
T O 2 0 1 5
As many other States in the region, Lebanon does not have a formal domestic refu-
gee legislation in place. Rather, asylum issues are attended to through immigration
laws, which monitor entry and exit of all, and includes a reference to refugees.39 The
1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their Exit
from the Country (Law of Entry and Exit)40 provides six articles relating to asylum.
Article 26 states that “Every foreigner who is persecuted or sentenced for a political
crime outside Lebanon, or whose life or liberty is threatened on account of political
activity, may apply for asylum in Lebanon.”
Importantly, Article 31 of the Law of Entry and Exit also provides for the non-
refoulement of a former political refugee. Even though the Law outlines a process for
making asylum decisions, which inter alia includes the establishment of an asylum-
granting Committee composed of the Minister of Interior, the Director-Generals of
the Ministries of Justice, Foreign Affairs and General Security, asylum through this
Committee has only be granted once.41 As Stevens notes, “the provisions on asylum
are in reality redundant” and Lebanon has adopted alternative practices, which in-
cludes the previously mentioned RSD processes by UNHCR.42
At the start of the conflict in Syria, Lebanon largely operated an “open door” pol-
icy towards Syrian nationals wishing to enter the country, and Syrians were generally
subject to the same provisions in domestic law that applies to other foreigners.
Beneficial to Syrians was nevertheless also a 1993 bilateral agreement for Economic
and Social Cooperation and Coordination between Lebanon and Syria. This agree-
ment set out principles of free movement of goods and people, and granted freedom
of work, residence, and economic activity for nationals of both countries. Since the
beginning of the Syrian conflict, it has also governed the entry of Syrian refugees
into Lebanon via official border crossings.43
Syrian refugees who entered Lebanon through an official border point with a valid
national Syrian identity card or passport received an “entry coupon” and “entry
stamp” that grants legal residency for an initial period of six months (for free), and
could be renewed free of charge for an additional six months.44 After one year Syrian
refugees were obliged to renew their residency at a cost of USD 200 per person/per
year for everyone 15 and above. While those present in Lebanon in violation of the
Law of Entry and Exit, for example through unofficial entry or expiry of legal stay,
would be subject to arrest, prosecution, and deportation, those who entered
39 Stevens, “Shifting Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection”.
40 Liban: Loi du 1962 réglementant l’entrée et le séjour des étrangers au Liban ainsi que leur sortie de ce
pays, Bulletin de Législation Libanaise (Journal Officiel), No. 28-1962, 10 Jul. 1962, available at: http://
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f30.html (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
41 Lebanese Center for Human Rights, Asylum Seekers and Refugees: Languishing in Injustice, Beirut,
Lebanese Center for Human Rights, 2011; Frontiers Ruwad Association, Legality vs Legitimacy: Detention
of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Lebanon, Beirut, Frontiers Ruwad Association, 2006, available at:
https://ohchr.tind.io/record/10985?ln¼en (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
42 Stevens, “Shifting Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection”.
43 Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum, Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees.
44 Ibid.; TRANSTEC, Beyond Humanitarian Assistance?.
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Lebanon irregularly could in principle also regularise their presence through the pay-
ment of a high fee.45
These regulations have been problematic in many different ways, not the least be-
cause the associated costs are unaffordable for a large number of refugees. And even
for refugees who have an entry coupon, being at the discretion of General Security,
renewals could be denied despite the refugees having all of the required documenta-
tion and funds.46 This practice has been aggravated by the fact that the Lebanese
Government has declared the Syrian refugee crisis not to be governed by law, but by
governmental decisions.47 As one Lebanese lawyer more precisely confirms, “the
Syrian situation is not governed by law, but by security policy”.48 As such, national
law and bilateral agreements have been continuously sidestepped.
Since 2013, authorities have begun to impose restrictions on those seeking to
enter Lebanon from Syria. Beginning with restrictions on entry for Palestinian refu-
gees from Syria in 2013, in June 2014 Lebanese authorities announced that only
Syrians from areas bordering Lebanon where there was fighting would be allowed to
enter the country.49 As this next section will show, in 2015, these regulations were
tightened further.
5 . C H A N G E S I N R E G U L A T I O N S 2 0 1 5
In December 2014, Lebanon’s GSO issued a new set of entry requirements for
Syrians and rules for Syrian nationals already in Lebanon applying for and renewing
residency permits (Palestinian refugees from Syria are not included). These are being
implemented as of 5 January 2015, and on 13 January, 3 and 23 February 2015, the
GSO issued further regulations concerning entry, residency renewal and regularisa-
tion. These new regulations are an implementation of the first provision in the
“Policy on Syrian Displacement” adopted in October 2014 to dissuade and prevent
Syria’s refugees from seeking protection in Lebanon. The new measures are note-
worthy for a number of reasons, not the least because they entail restrictive condi-
tions that are only applicable to Syrian nationals, and hence are discriminatory in
comparison to other foreigners.50
5.1. Entry requirements
Admission to Lebanon for Syrians is today restricted to those who can produce valid
identity documents and proof that their stay in Lebanon fits into one of the approved
entry categories. A list of categories for which admission would be granted includes
the following: category one for tourism, shopping, business, landlords, and tenants;
45 Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum, Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees.
46 Ibid.
47 Oxfam, Lebanon: Looking Ahead in Times of Crisis, Oxfam Discussion Papers, Oxford, Oxfam, 2015, avail-
able at: https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/lebanon-looking-ahead-times-crisis (last visited 1 Oct.
2016).
48 Confidential interview, NGO staff, Beirut, 11 Mar. 2016.
49 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge. NOW Media, “Lebanon Imposes Entry Restrictions on
Syrians”, NOW Media, 24 Jul. 2013, available at https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/lebanonnews/lebanon-
imposes-entry-restrictions-on-syrians (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
50 Frangieh, “Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians”.
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category two for studying; category three for transiting to a third country; category
four for those displaced; category five for medical treatment; category six for an em-
bassy appointment; and category seven for those entering with a pledge of responsi-
bility (a Lebanese sponsor). All require specified documents to meet the
requirements and have their visa approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the
Ministry of Interior before being allowed entry into Lebanon. The majority of these
categories also allow entry into Lebanon for a defined period of time, ranging from
24 hours to one month for a temporary business visa. In some cases the entry permit
can be extended, for example, for medical cases and for embassy appointments.51
Not only is the potential of exploitation of Syrians increased due to the applica-
tion of the sponsorship system in entry category seven, Syrian refugees are being
treated differently depending on their financial situation. As has been observed by
Frangieh, the list of reasons stipulated by the Government “aims to deny entry to
poorer Syrians, while keeping the borders open to those who enjoy good financial
standing”.52 Entrants must, for example, show proof of hotel reservations and posses-
sion of a sum of a thousand dollars for a tourist visa, or proof of ownership of real es-
tate in Lebanon. As I will show in a forthcoming section, this differentiation between
Syrians with or without good finances, continues in the residency renewal procedure.
However, these new regulations have also led to a fully-fledged black market in
which, as one Lebanese lawyer has observed, “Guys are renting out money at the
border for 100 USD. And not only on the border, they are also available on all
General Security points for entry and renewal. Businessmen are taking advantage of
this and exploiting any deficiency in the legal system.”53 As my interlocutor Ghassan,
from Latakia, similarly has experienced:
When the Syrian comes in he has some options, most of them have a hotel
booking, and 1000 USD. But from where can they get the 1000 USD? So
some people they sit at the borders renting the 1000 USD with 50 USD. They
give it to you, to show it to the officer and when you come out you give
it back. Even the hotel booking, there are agencies that are open which
make fake bookings. The people in this region have the capability of violating
any laws.54
Even then, this option of using the black market is also limited to those with suffi-
cient financial means.
As is furthermore clear in the new regulations, there are no categories for those
fleeing armed conflict, violence, or persecution and seeking safety in Lebanon; the
category for “displaced” persons in fact requires compliance with one of the other
categories, or with the Government’s “humanitarian exceptions criteria”.55 The crite-
ria for this last requirement were disclosed first in April 2015 to specifically apply to
51 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
52 Frangieh, “Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians”.
53 Confidential interview, NGO staff, Beirut, 11 Mar. 2016.
54 Ghassan, Beirut Governorate, 23 Feb. 2016. To preserve anonymity, all names of Syrian refugees have
been changed in this article.
55 Norwegian Refugee Council & International Rescue Committee, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria.
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“Unaccompanied and/or separated children with a parent already registered in
Lebanon; persons living with disabilities with a relative already registered in
Lebanon; persons with urgent medical needs for whom treatment in Syria is unavail-
able; persons who will be resettled to third countries.”56
As such, the category for the “displaced” does not include most of those fleeing
the Syrian conflict, in contravention of Lebanon’s obligations under the customary
law principle of non-refoulement. As Frangieh has argued, this criteria is rather “clearly
aimed at maintaining selectivity and nebulousness in terms of determining its applic-
ability to new entries”.57 Seen together, then, the new entry requirements have en-
tailed that many people attempting to flee the conflict in Syria cannot reach safety in
Lebanon. Many refugees are forced to resort to hazardous irregular border crossings,
with frequent media reports surfacing on mass arrests for irregular entry.58
5.2. Renewing and maintaining residency
On top of preliminary entry requirements, Syrian refugees are confronted with ser-
ious obstacles to maintaining their legal status in Lebanon. As explained above, until
2014, Lebanon employed regulations that requested Syrian refugees to renew their
residency after one year in Lebanon at a cost of USD 200, and these renewals were
at the discretion of General Security. The new General Security regulations retain
the requirement of residency renewal every six months for a USD 200 fee. However,
new criteria are now applied for Syrian nationals wishing to renew their residency or
otherwise regularise their immigration status in Lebanon.
For those Syrian nationals who apply to renew their residency permits, Lebanese
authorities divide them into two categories: those registered with UNHCR and those
who are not. Both categories are required to pay a fee of USD 200 and in addition
provide: a housing commitment (certified copies of a lease agreement or real estate
deed);59 certified attestation from a mukhtar (village leader) that the landlord owns
the property; and show valid ID or passport, as well as entry slip and return card.
The process of obtaining a housing pledge is a tedious one, not only entailing the
signature of a landlord or a tenant (subletting to the Syrian refugee in question) con-
firming that he or she is hosting a Syrian household and committing to notify the
local GSO when the occupancy ends, but also the demonstration by the landlord or
tenant of his/her rights to the property by either presenting a certified copy of the
property deed, or a lease agreement.60 For Syrian nationals living in informal tented
56 Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Protection Monthly Dashboard April 2015; Amnesty International, New
Entry Requirements for Syrians Likely to Block Would-be Refugees, London, public statement, Amnesty
International, 2015, available at: http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/public_statements/Lebanon_
New_entry_requirements_for_Syrians_likely_to_block_would-be_refugees.pdf (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
57 Frangieh, “Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians”.
58 Daily Star, “Over 50 Arrested across Lebanon for Illegal Entry”, Daily Star, 4 May, 2016, available at:
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2016/May-04/350521-army-arrests-50-in-east-leba
non-over-illegal-entry.ashx (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
59 In the summer of 2016, negotiations between the humanitarian community and the Lebanese
Government led to a Government acceptance of a UNHCR attestation in lieu of a housing commitment
when refugees come to renewing their residency. Discussions are on-going as to the implementation of
these procedural changes.
60 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
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settlements, there is a requirement to provide a residency statement from the local
municipality stating this.
Syrians who are registered with UNHCR must additionally provide: a pledge not
to work, signed in the presence of a notary, which states that they will not work in
Lebanon;61 UNHCR registration certificate; and proof of their financial means such
as bank statements, documents showing money transfers or proof of charitable or
UN support, such as World Food Programme prepaid cards.62 According to
UNHCR, some refugees are also asked to sign a notarised pledge that they will re-
turn to Syria when their permit expires or when requested by the Government.
For refugees not registered with UNHCR, an additional requirement includes a
“pledge of responsibility”. This pledge can either be a sponsorship for an individual
work permit by a Lebanese individual, or a group pledge of responsibility provided
by a registered entity that hires a number of Syrian nationals.63 Syrians in Lebanon
are currently only permitted to work in three sectors: agriculture, construction, and
environment (formerly referred to as “cleaning”). When asked about these limita-
tions, one Government representative explained how, “These are the chosen fields
because Lebanon sees the necessity of these fields and because Syrians are experts in
these fields.”64 This classist idea of who a “Syrian” is and what work he or she can do
can in part be explained by Lebanon’s long reliance on the presence of a large, low-
wage Syrian labour force.65 Indeed, although exact figures do not exist, estimates for
the early 2000s claimed that Syrians constituted between 20 and 40 per cent of
Lebanon’s labour force.66
The sponsorship system, which previously only applied to third-country migrants
and domestic workers, entails that employers take full responsibility for the concerned
individual. The sponsor is as such not only responsible for the Syrian national’s living
costs and liable for his/her misdemeanours, but is also required to be present at the
General Security Office for any renewals of the Syrian national’s residency permit.
Several Syrians interviewed in the process of this research expressed difficulties in
securing a sponsor. As Ziad, a day-labourer in eastern Beqqa, experienced:
There are around more than 2 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, it’s impos-
sible to find a sponsor for every person here in Lebanon. I’m renting a place
here in Lebanon and I don’t know any Lebanese, it’s impossible for the land-
lord to sponsor me because there are difficult conditions. They have to secure
food, drink and home.67
61 In the summer of 2016, the Lebanese Government agreed to replace the pledge not to work with with a
commitment to abide by Lebanese law. Discussions are on-going as to the implementation of these pro-
cedural changes.
62 UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. Quarterly Snapshot January–March 2015, Lebanon, UNHCR, 2015,
available at: https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id¼8804 (last visited 1 Oct. 2016);
Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
63 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
64 Confidential interview, Government official, Beirut, 18 Apr. 2016.
65 J. Chalcraft, The Invisible Cage: Syrian Migrant Workers in Lebanon, London, Stanford University Press,
2009.
66 Ibid.
67 Ziad, Zahle Governorate, 25 Mar. 2016.
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The new procedures for renewal of residency permits are, moreover, so onerous and
expensive that many people are unable to renew their permits. Kamil, a journalist
from Suweida, had legal residency in Lebanon until the new regulations were put in
place. Having secured work at a foreign news agency Kamil had a better financial
standing than most. But even then, at the time of our interview, he had been working
for six months to renew his residency “but the conditions imposed by the Lebanese
government are very difficult”.68 Kamil was markedly uncomfortable and stressed
about being “illegal” in Lebanon:
Before they imposed the residency [new regulations] I was very cautious to re-
new my papers legally. By nature I like to be the law [doing everything legally],
and I like to give everything its right, and legally. But when they imposed the
sponsorship, that was difficult for us and we couldn’t achieve it and despite
that I’m trying to do it, because I like to abide by the law.
Paying the costs associated with the new regulations is an insurmountable struggle in
itself and one that only very few Syrian refugees can afford.69 Apart from the half-
yearly USD 200 residency renewal fee, all of the pledges and documents required for
this renewal must be signed by a notary public, which again requires an additional
payment to the notary office. In addition, it is clear that most refugees will be unable
to meet the requirements.
Many Syrian refugees cannot produce the documents required by the new regu-
lations. Most do not have formal lease agreements or ways of demonstrating that
they have financial means to live in Lebanon.70 In many cases, municipal councils
decided to refrain from registering any lease agreements concluded by Syrians.71
Although a study conducted in 2014, before the most recent regulatory changes,
found that almost all rental agreements for Syrian refugees in Mount Lebanon and
Beirut Governorates were informal agreements that did not involve any form of
contract,72 a more recent study found that as many as 82 per cent of those Syrian
refugees that pay rent do not have written lease agreements with their landlords, es-
pecially in the low-cost housing markets.73 And for those who may be able to pro-
vide all the necessary documents and pay the required fees their request to renew
their residency permits can be denied by General Security, for reasons that are often
unclear.
68 Kamil, Mount Lebanon Governorate, 4 May 2016.
69 UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. Quarterly Snapshot January–March 2015.
70 Ibid.
71 Lebanese Institute for Democracy and Human Rights (LIFE), Unprotected Refugees: The Legal Report on the
Situation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, Beirut, LIFE, 2015, available at: http://lifeinstitute.me/uploads/The%
20legal%20report%20on%20the%20situation%20of%20Syrian%20refugees%20in%20Lebanon%20-%20eng.
pdf (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
72 Norwegian Refugee Council & Save the Children, Evictions in Beirut and Mount Lebanon: Rates and
Reasons, Beirut, Norwegian Refugee Council & Save the Children, 2014, available at: http://www.nrc.no/
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5.3. Palestinian Refugees from Syria
While Lebanon largely applied an open-door policy to most Syrians in the early years
of the Syrian conflict, Palestinian refugees fleeing Syria have been subjected to a sep-
arate policy. In line with Lebanon’s longstanding attempts to reduce the size of the
country’s Palestinian population,74 the country has placed increasing restrictions on
Palestinians wishing to enter from Syria. These changes in entry and stay regulations
for Palestinian refugees from Syria began already in the summer of 2013, with the
need for a valid pre-approved visa which required an application made by a guarantor
in Lebanon.75
In May 2014, the Lebanese Government implemented new entry requirements ef-
fectively closing the border to all Palestinian refugees from Syria.76 The new, stricter
conditions entail that Palestinian refugees from Syria can enter only if they have an
embassy appointment, are transiting to a third country (with proof of airline tickets
and a visa to the third country) or with a pledge of responsibility. Unlike other refu-
gees from Syria, they cannot benefit from the humanitarian exceptions clause.77 This
has entailed that, for the Palestinian refugee community from Syria, accessing safety
in Lebanon is very difficult if not impossible, leaving many in a precarious
situation.78
6 . C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F 2 0 1 5 R E G U L A T I O N S O F L E G A L S T A T U S
The 2015 Policy on Syrian Displacement has been criticised by leading human rights
lawyers for its focus on “manufacturing vulnerability”, meaning that the policy aims
to strip various groups of their fundamental rights in order to reject their presence
and facilitate their exploitation.79 Under the new Policy, Syrians are thus left with
two options: they either leave Lebanon or stay and accept exploitation, which in
some cases even may amount to forced labour and human trafficking.
6.1. Rejection of presence
The difficulties associated with renewing residency permits have entailed a drastic in-
crease in the number of Syrian refugees who lack valid legal status in Lebanon. One
study suggests that the percentage of Syrian households without valid residency has
steadily risen from 9 per cent in January 2015 to over 61 per cent at the end of July
2015.80 Another study estimated that in 2015, 70 per cent of Syrian refugees in
74 M. Dumper, “Palestinian Refugees”, in G. Loescher, J. Milner, E. Newman & G. Troeller (eds.),
Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications, Tokyo & New York,
United Nations University Press, 2008, 189–213; J. M. Peteet, Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian
Refugee Camps, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.
75 Norwegian Refugee Council & International Rescue Committee, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria;
Amnesty International, New Entry Requirements for Syrians Likely to Block Would-be Refugees.
76 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
77 Oxfam, Lebanon: Looking Ahead in Times of Crisis.
78 Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Minutes of Inter-sectoral Meeting: Beirut, 12 June 2015.
79 N. Saghieh, “Manufacturing Vulnerability in Lebanon: Legal Policies as Efficient Tools of
Discrimination”, Legal Agenda, 19 Mar. 2015, available at: http://english.legal-agenda.com/article.php?
id¼690&folder¼articles&lang¼en (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
80 Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Protection Monthly Dashboard July 2015, Beirut, Inter-agency
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Lebanon did not have valid legal stay in the country.81 The situation for Palestinian
refugees from Syria is much worse, with 90 per cent lacking valid residency docu-
ments in September 2015.82 Without a valid residency permit, refugees are con-
sidered to be in breach of Lebanese law, and may, in accordance with the Law on
Entry and Exit, be detained by security and be forcibly returned to Syria.
The lack of legal stay has already taken its toll on refugees in the country, some
describing it as having to live through another siege. As Kamil from Suweida explains:
The least that could be done, as long as we are offering this country all of our
duties, as if you come here as a guest there are certain duties towards you, and
as long as we are fulfilling these duties the least that could be done is having our
residency. This is causing psychological instability, and we as Syrians are like
under a siege, the countries hosting us are so few now. So we don’t have any
choices now, this is all of course affecting us and affecting our psychological sta-
tus. We feel like we are under siege in the countries hosting refugees.83
The lack of valid residency permits brings on a growing sense of insecurity in refugee
communities, where many, given their irregular status in the country, are fearful of
arrest or detention, or feeling increasingly vulnerable to abuse.84 Indeed, as Frangieh
has noted, refugees become less likely to turn to the Lebanese State for protection,
and are as such “not only rendered outlaws, but outside the protection of the law”.85
While Lebanon publically adheres to the principle of non-refoulement, Frangieh has
argued that the country in fact evades the principle by engaging in what she calls a
practice of “legal deportation”, consisting of the issuance of deportation orders and
informing refugees that they must leave Lebanon.86 Saeed, a 25-year old former en-
gineering student now living in a mountain village in Lebanon’s northern region,
experienced this when he was arrested for irregular entry in 2014:
I stayed [imprisoned] 45 days, with interrogations and information and then I
was released, and they gave me a card for exiting Lebanon. To leave Lebanon
immediately, it was valid for just 10 days [leave Lebanon in 10 days]. And until
now it’s the same thing, I have no papers or anything.87
This practice has been explained by a Government official to be a middle ground:
Sometimes compromises have to be done: one example is the issuance of de-
portation orders for illegal residency – the CAT [Convention against Torture]
81 C. Alsharabati & J. Nammour, Survey on Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Full Report, Beirut,
Université de Saint Joseph, 2015, available at: https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?
id¼9335 (last visited 1 Oct. 2016).
82 Oxfam, Lebanon: Looking Ahead in Times of Crisis.
83 Kamil, Mount Lebanon Governorate, 4 May 2016.
84 UNHCR, Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. Quarterly Snapshot January–March 2015.
85 Frangieh, “Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians”.
86 Ibid.
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says we cannot deport, but our law requires it. So we do not deport but we
issue deportation orders. This way we are respecting our own national laws
but not breaching our international obligations.88
Not all agree that this practice is not in breach of Lebanon’s international obligations.
As Frangieh argues, in the past, Lebanese authorities had used “prolonged arbitrary
detention as a means to coerce refugees to ‘agree’ to be returned to their home coun-
try”, but today, they are “using the method of refusing to grant residence permits to
a number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon”.89 In other words, “such measures seem to
circumvent the principle of non-refoulement by placing the Syrian refugees in a vulner-
able position that would drive them to leave Lebanon whenever possible”.90 Thus,
when the refugees’ exercise of their right of protection from refoulement becomes a
criminal offense, any return to their country of origin would amount to refoulement.
If one were to accept this line of thought, hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees
without legal stay in Lebanon would be at immediate risk of refoulement.
For many Syrian refugees, remaining in Lebanon brings about a most precarious
legal position. They are deprived of the rights enjoyed by legal residents in Lebanon,
including enrolment in public schools, opening a bank account, and acquiring lawful
employment. Obtaining civil documents such as birth certificates also requires valid
legal status; according to a 2014 survey, 72 per cent of Syrian refugee new-borns in
Lebanon did not have an official birth certificate due to bureaucratic requirements
that the parents could not fulfil.91
Limited freedom of movement can be seen as the main consequence of limited
legal status for Syrian refugees, resulting in lack of access to services, particularly
healthcare and education and lack of accessing UNHCR registration. A 2015 survey
found that as many as 67 per cent of interviewed Syrian refugees reported restric-
tions on freedom of movement as a main challenge with limited legal status.92 Fears
include arrest and detention at both regular and ad hoc checkpoints operated by the
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), GSO, Internal Security Forces and other security
forces. In certain areas, political parties also act to limit movement, including the use
of curfews.
These findings are mirrored in my interviews with Syrians in Lebanon, many of
whom have set up their own mechanisms to cope. Walid from Al-Qusayr, fortunate
enough to have access to a car, avoids highways and driving late in the evening, and
has made a habit of using minor roads and checkpoints known to be “easy” and
“friendly”.93 Or as Ziad from Zabadani, now living in a village in eastern Beqqa, ex-
plained to me:
When there are checkpoints on the road I don’t take that route. We have a
page on WhatsApp, for example a person here and a person in the end of
88 Confidential interview, Government official, Beirut, 18 Apr. 2016.
89 Frangieh, “Lebanon Places Discriminatory Entry Restrictions on Syrians”.
90 Ibid.
91 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge.
92 Norwegian Refugee Council & International Rescue Committee, Legal Status of Refugees from Syria.
93 Walid, Tripoli Governorate, 21 Mar. 2016.
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[village], and a person in another place: “Guys, take care there’s a checkpoint
don’t pass through it,” we have like something very simple but to warn each
other.94
Many informants have also expressed a sentiment that considerably more men than
women are subject to arrest and problems at checkpoints, and it is therefore not un-
common for men to stay at home while women and children move around to work
or to do necessary chores.
The discretion of the Lebanese security apparatus is perhaps most visible in cases
where Syrian refugees have not been able to secure an exit visa to leave Lebanon as
this would require the regularisation of one’s stay in the country. In other words, in
order to leave Lebanon through an official border, a Syrian refugee has to have a
“clean slate” with the Government and not have any unpaid residency bills. As one
Lebanese lawyer explains:
Today if you want to leave, some people can regularize their status at the air-
port and exit. But not everyone, you cannot know [whether you can leave or
not]. Because it depends upon whether General Security has issued an internal
warrant against you, not an external one, which means that it is a warrant that
you can only find out about when you are at the General Security. You can’t
even find it out at the Police station. It’s a very internal memo by the General
Security: “This person is wanted by this department.” If wanted for not leaving
[the country], nobody cares, it just means that you have to go through the bur-
eaucracy and you cannot exit automatically at the airport. And this is a huge
number of people.95
The practice of withholding exit visas to those who haven’t paid their residency fees
may seem peculiar for a Government who has an expressed wish to reduce the num-
ber of Syrian refugees on its territory, but there appears to be a certain, albeit twisted,
logic to it. As the Lawyer continues:
At the same time, we want them to leave, we are encouraging them to leave,
but when they want to leave we are returning them from the airport telling
them “No, go get the permission to leave”, then we’re punishing them for not
leaving when we told them to leave and getting them to wait for months to get
the permission to leave. There is nothing more inefficient than that. But this is
a clear policy – for the General Security, this is done on purpose, and the pur-
pose is because we do not want them here, we cannot stabilize their situation
here, otherwise nobody would take them.96
For individuals being resettled through UNHCR, the cost of unpaid residency is usu-
ally taken by UNHCR, but this does not necessarily exempt those travelling from
94 Ziad, Zahle Governorate, 25 Mar. 2016.
95 Confidential interview, NGO staff, Beirut, 11 Mar. 2016.
96 Confidential interview, NGO staff, Beirut, 11 Mar. 2016.
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having problems getting out of the country. Munir from Zabadani had been accepted
for resettlement in a European country in the autumn of 2015, but had not managed
to secure legal residency in Lebanon. As such, he was fearful even of travelling from
his home in the Beqqa to the UN offices in Beirut in order to conduct the needed
paperwork and to pick up his ticket to travel to Europe. As Munir explains:
I met a guy by chance who was going to Beirut to receive his plane ticket and I
asked him to get me mine as well. So, I called the guy telling him it’s okay to
give him my plane tickets and the paper of my resettlement and I will receive
them here in Beqaa. When the time comes to travel it won’t be a problem on
the road.
He continues:
Here is when it all started. The immigration department called me to tell me
you can’t travel. I asked him “what happened?” He told me “The Lebanese
government disagreed [with] your travel, and you’re banned from travelling”
and it withdrew your papers that I have sent.
Munir did not manage to solve these issues before his travel date that autumn, and
only managed to leave Lebanon five months later after considerable lobbying by in-
fluential Lebanese friends.97
6.2. Facilitating exploitation
The pledge for UNHCR-registered refugees not to work entails that these are en-
tirely reliant on aid assistance and increasingly at risk of being hindered from access-
ing work opportunities or pushed towards informal and exploitative labour.98
Indeed, the pledge comes in addition to a general reluctance to grant work permits
to Syrians—the total number of Syrians formally working in Lebanon was estimated
at 1,568 at the end of 2014.99 Research has furthermore confirmed that limited legal
status for Syrian refugees increases the risk of abuse and exploitation, and decreases
their ability to seek redress and access justice.100
These same risks are arguably embedded in the sponsorship system for Syrian na-
tionals, which seemingly builds upon Lebanon’s system of sponsorship for other mi-
grants. Under the pretext of sponsorship, Syrian refugees can thus be subject to
Government-sanctioned exploitation. Characteristic of this kefala or sponsorship sys-
tem is that the legal relationship between employer and employee “appears most
97 Munir, Zahle Governorate, 25 Jan. 2016.
98 Inter-agency Coordination Lebanon, Livelihoods Sector: Mid-Year Dashboard: June 2015, United Nations
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analogous to a parent and child, or alternatively, master and slave or servant”.101 In
some cases, workers are forced to endure very harsh work conditions due to fear of
dismissal and subsequent deportation, and may even, as Saghieh has noted, have to
pay large sums of money or relinquish their rights before the employer agrees to
transfer their sponsorship to another person.102 Unsurprisingly, a black market has
opened up also for the sale of sponsorships, as one Lebanese lawyer confirms: “You
can buy a sponsorship today, for between 500 and 1000 USD. It’s very common.”103
At the same time, many Lebanese nationals are cautious about becoming such spon-
sors, as this would to a greater or lesser extent put them under observation by the
GSO, an inconvenience few Lebanese are willing to take.104
While often enduring exploitative conditions, it nevertheless appears as if few
refugees have been prosecuted for working illegally in the country. As one prosecutor
in Mount Lebanon Governorate argued: “In six years here I have not seen a single
case, I don’t think other districts are prosecuting these cases either. Most people are
working openly [. . .] We couldn’t possibly prosecute everyone for this.”105 The logic
behind this non-prosecution was explained to me by another Government official:
The Lebanese government is turning a blind eye because the government
knows it is necessary for them to work, in order to not commit crimes. They
are left with two options: either work illegally, or commit crimes. Thus turning
the blind eye is the better option.106
That said, refugees in Lebanon seeking to renew their residency are frequently
questioned about whether or not they have been working, and the extent of this
work, probing some to, when faced with a rejected residency application, seek a
sponsor instead. As Mariam, heading a local NGO and a school in the Beqqa,
experienced:
[The] first year when they started issuing these [new] laws for Syrians, I made
a rent contract, the second year I wanted to renew the same contract, they
asked about me and they found out I work, it wasn’t even allowed to do volun-
teering jobs. So they asked about me and they found out I have a school, so I
told them this is volunteering they told me it’s not even allowed. So they didn’t
want to ratify the rent contract, so I had to resort to the sponsorship.107
But as she continues, “The issue of sponsorship, it’s an insult here in Lebanon. They
sponsor you as labourer, you would have very fancy degrees and at the end of the
day you’re working as a doorman [. . .].” When Mariam received news that she was
sponsored as a “helper,” she “stayed depressed for around a week.” Kamil from
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Suweida expresses the same sentiment about needing to find a sponsor within the of-
ficially accepted fields of work: “Unfortunately, here they demand the sponsored to
be a farmer or concierge, and I’m a journalist so maybe I’d have to have a sponsor-
ship as an agricultural worker.”108
Responding to pressure from UNHCR to exempt Syrian refugees from residency
permits and to remove the pledge not to work, one Government official explains
how:
They [UNHCR] ask us to remove the pledge not to work for Syrian refugees.
But by law we cannot remove it, our labour law specifies three sectors of work.
We cannot change that without a new legislative process. They also ask us to
exempt Syrian refugees from residency permits. Again, this needs a change in
law, and we cannot do this.109
In March 2015, however, several leading Lebanese human rights lawyers submitted a
lawsuit against the Government concerning the recent regulations, arguing among
other things that “everybody knows that today there is a booming business in secur-
ing sponsorships, securing hotel reservations, fake documents and others” while
“state is claiming that it is protecting refugees against exploitation”.110 A related issue
that appears to soon be challenged in Lebanese courts is the very extension of the
kefala system to Syrian nationals. Several lawyers have pointed out that the applica-
tion of this system to Syrians is in fact a breach of domestic law as it, on the one
hand, breaches the previously mentioned bilateral agreement with Syria, and, on the
other, has no legal basis whatsoever.111
7 . C O N C L U S I O N S
This article has explored the legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, particularly
in light of recent regulatory changes. Lebanon has an ambiguous approach to the
Syrian refugee influx, which is exacerbated by the current political deadlock, 30 years
of Syrian military presence, and the country’s long-term Palestinian refugee presence.
The country does not have any formal domestic refugee legislation in place, even
though the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and
their Exit from the Country provides six articles relating to asylum. These provisions
are nevertheless largely redundant, and the Lebanese government has continuously
sidestepped other relevant national legislation—including the Lebanese
Constitution—when attending to the country’s Syrian refugee presence.
While Lebanon is not a party to the UN Refugee Convention, by way of custom-
ary international law, the country is bound by leading principles of refugee protec-
tion, not the least the principle of non-refoulement. However, amid the lack of an
updated Memorandum of Understanding, the Lebanese Government does not cur-
rently give legal effect to the UNHCR’s recognition of refugee status and treats most
108 Kamil, Mount Lebanon Governorate, 4 May 2016.
109 Confidential interview, Government official, Beirut, 18 Apr. 2016.
110 Confidential interview, NGO staff, Beirut, 11 Mar. 2016.
111 Confidential interviews, NGO staff, Beirut, 5 Mar. 2016; NGO staff, Beirut, 11 Mar. 2016.
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Syrian refugees as illegal immigrants liable to arrest and deportation. This criminal-
isation of refugee presence may place Syrian refugees in such a vulnerable situation
that it may de facto force some refugees to leave Lebanon, a scenario which may be
in breach of Lebanon’s international obligations.
In October 2014, Lebanon’s Council of Ministers adopted a comprehensive pol-
icy on Syrian displacement, one explicit goal of which is to decrease the number of
Syrians in Lebanon by reducing access to territory and encouraging return to Syria.
This ambition is currently being implemented through the December 2014 GSO
new set of entry requirements for Syrians and new rules for Syrian nationals already
in Lebanon applying for and renewing residency permits, in force as of January 2015.
This article finds that the 2015 regulatory changes leave many refugees in a deeply
precarious legal position. As Mariam expressed it: “There are challenges in every-
thing, in everything we’re living. In everything. I consider Lebanon as a piece of land
[that] they told us ‘there you go, stay in it, and figure it out on your own.’ Honestly
that’s the description.”112 Indeed, the strict entry requirements entail that many peo-
ple attempting to flee the conflict in Syria cannot reach safety in Lebanon, and the
new criteria concerning the renewal or regularisation of legal stay are so onerous and
expensive that most people are unable to renew their permits. As such, an over-
whelming majority of Syrian refugees are present in Lebanon without legal stay. For
the Palestinian refugee community from Syria, accessing safety in Lebanon has pro-
ven very difficult if not impossible. In essence, then, Syrians in Lebanon are left with
two options: either they leave the country, if they at all can, or stay and accept ex-
ploitation and marginalisation.
112 Mariam, Zahle Governorate, 23 Mar. 2016.
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